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Report of the Task Force on Rule 102 (e) 
Proceedings: Rule 102(e) Sanctions Against 
Accountants 
By the Task Force on Rule 1 02(e) Proceedings* 
INTRODUCTION 
Under Rule 1 02(e) of its Rules of Practice, 1 the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Commission) may sanction accountants, lawyers, 
and other professionals who "practice before the Commission. "2 If the 
Commission provides the professional with notice and the opportunity for 
a hearing, it can sanction that professional on a determination that the 
professional engaged in what the rule describes as "improper professional 
conduct. " 3 
*The Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities (Committee) of the American Bar 
Association 's Section of Business Law (Section) formed this task force to consider the stan-
dards that the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission should apply in imposing a sanction 
upon an accountant pursuant to Rule I 02(e). This report sets forth the result of that consid-
eration. The members of the Task Force on Rule 102(e) Proceedings (I'ask Force) are: Dixie 
L.Johnson (Co-Chair),John H. Sture (Co-Chair), Kenneth B. Winer (Co-Chair),Jayne W. 
Barnard, Evan]. Falchuk,Jeffrey T. Gilleran, Thomas Gorman, David B. Hardison, Gloria 
K. Niemi, and Thomas L. Riesenberg. 
The Task Force is comprised of members of the Committee's Subcommittee on Civil 
Litigation and Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement Matters. A draft of this 
report was circulated for comment among members of this subcommittee and the chairs and 
vice-chairs of the other subcommittees and task forces of the Committee, the officers of the 
Committee, the members of the Advisory Committee of the Committee, and the officers of 
the Section. A substantial majority of those who have reviewed the Report in draft form have 
indicated their general agreement with the views expressed. This report, however, does not 
represent the official position of the American Bar Association, the Section, or the Commit-
tee, nor does it necessarily reflect the views of all of those who have reviewed it. 
I. 17 C.F.R. § 201.1 02(e) (1996). Prior to 1995, the authority was set forth in Rule 2(e) of 
the Commission's Rules of Practice, which was substantially identical to the current Rule 
I 02(e). For ease of reference, this report refers to Rule I 02(e) even when the rule in effect at 
the time of the precedents described was Rule 2(e). 
2. While there has been substantial controversy surrounding the imposition of Rule 102(e) 
sanctions against lawyers, the American Bar Association has previously articulated its position 
with regard to lawyers. This report is not intended to address the imposition of Rule 102(e) 
sanctions against lawyers, and should not be read to suggest that its premises, analysis, or 
recommendation apply to the imposition of Rule I 02(e) sanctions against lawyers. 
3. 17 C.F.R. §201.102(e). 
965 
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Although Rule I 02(e) is now in its seventh decade of existence, the 
criteria used by the Commission in determining what constitutes "im-
proper professional conduct" remain far from well-defined.4 Concerns re-
lating to the sanctioning of accountants have become particularly acute 
since the Commission's 1992 opinion in In re Checkosky ( Checkosky !), in 
which the Commission indicated that a negligent failure to adhere to au-
diting standards constituted improper professional conduct.5 Following an 
appeal of that decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
ordered the Commission to identify its standards for the imposition ofRule 
1 02(e) sanctions, to clarify whether its position was that negligent conduct 
could give rise to 1 02(e) sanctions.6 
The Commission's response, however, issued in itsjanuary 1997 In re 
4. This ambiguity has caused much debate and controversy. See, e.g., Judah Best, In Op-
position to Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 36 Bus. LAw. 1815 (1981); Robert A. Downing & Richard L. 
Miller, Jr., The Distortion ar1d Misuse !![Rule 2(e) , 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 774 (1979); Ralph C . 
Ferrara, Administrative Disciplirwry Proceedings U11der Rule 2(e), 36 Bus. LAw. 1807 ( 1981 ); Daniel 
L. Goelzer, The SEC and Opinion Shopping: A Case Study in the Changing Regulation if the Accounting 
Prqfession, 52 BROOK. L. REV. I 05 7 ( 1987); Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 
2(e): Securities and Exchange Commission Discipline if Prifessiollals, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 652 (1991); 
Roberta S. Karmel, A Delicate Assignment: The Regulation if Accou11tants by the SEC, 56 N.Y.U. L. 
REV . 959 ( 1981 ); Michael R . Lanzarone, Prifessional Discipline: Unfairness and Indficiency in the 
Administrative Process, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 818 (1983); Philip H . Levy, Regulation if the Ac-
counting Prifessiorl Through Rule 2 (e) if the SEC's Rules if Practice: Valid or Invalid Exercise if Power?, 
46 BROOK. L. REV. 1159 (1980); Harold Marsh,Jr., Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAw. 987 
( 1980); Christine Neylon O'Brien, SEC Regulation if the Accounting Prifession: Rule 2(e), 21 GONZ. 
L. R EV. 675 (1985); Quinton E Seamons, Inside the Labyrinth if the Elusive Standard Under tlze 
SEC's Rule 2(e), 23 SEC. REG. LJ. 57 (1995); George J. Siedel, Rule 2(e) and Corporate Officers, 
39 Bus. LAw. 455 ( 1984); Mindy Jaffe Smolevitz, Tlze Opinion Shopping Phenomenon: Corporate 
America's Search for tlze Perftct Auditor, 52 BROOK. L. REV. I 077 ( 1987); James R. Doty et al. , 
The Prifessional as Difendant, in 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTI' ON SECURITIES REGULATION 681 
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 84-6978, 1991 ); Michael]. Crane, 
Note, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Accountants: Tlze Need for a More Ascertainable Improper Prqfes-
sional Conduct Standard in the SEC's Rule 2(e), 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 351 (1984). 
5. In re Checkosky (Checkosky 1), Exchange Act Release No. 31,094, 52 S.E.C . Docket 
(CCH) 1122, 1133 (Aug. 26, 1992). As will be set forth in more detail , in Checkosky I, two 
accountants had argued, among other things, that a finding of improper professional conduct 
could only be made where there was willful misconduct of the sort that would constitute 
scimter under§ l O(b) and Rule I Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 
15 U.S. C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.ER. § 240.1 Ob-5 (1996). Noting that it could sanction ac-
countants under Rule I 02(e) in the absence of scienter, the Commission found that the two 
accountants had acted recklessly and imposed Rule 102(e) sanctions on them. Checkosky I, 52 
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) at 1132-33. 
6. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 E3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A panel of judges of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued three separate opinions, evidencing the lack of 
judicial consensus as to the propriety of the Commission's current use of Rule I 02(e). Because 
two judges believed the Commission either had not articulated the standard of culpability 
applicable to Rule I 02(e) proceedings, or had not explained why the standard adopted ap-
plied to the accountants ' conduct, the case was remanded to the Commission for a "more 
adequate explanation of its interpretation of Rule 2(e)(l)(ii) and its application to this case. " 
/d. (per curiam). 
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Checkosky opinion ( Checkosky If), provides little clarification. 7 Instead of iden-
tifying a threshold mental state for the imposition of sanctions on account-
ants, two commissioners, acting as a majority, stated that Rule I 02(e) "does 
not mandate a particular mental state."8 Moreover, instead of clarifying 
whether or not negligent conduct alone provides a sufficient basis for the 
imposition of sanctions under Rule l02(e), the Commission maintained 
that "negligent actions by a professional may, under certain circumstances, 
constitute improper professional conduct. "9 
Because the Commission declined to identify these "certain circum-
stances," the Task Force believes that the Commission should undertake 
a reappraisal of the standards it will apply in determining what constitutes 
"improper professional conduct" by an accountant. The Task Force be-
lieves that, in light of a number of factors, including the extraordinary 
impact of Rule l 02( e) sanctions, as well as the standards applicable to the 
imposition of similar sanctions in other contexts, the Commission should 
impose Rule 102(e) sanctions only where an accountant's prior activities, 
considered together with the accountant's current circumstances, dem-
onstrate that he or she is presently substantially unfit to appear and prac-
tice before the Commission, and, therefore, poses a current threat to the 
Commission's processes. 
Part I of this report provides a brief overview of the provisions of Rule 
1 02(e), as well as the historical bases for the imposition of sanctions under 
the rule. Part II considers the limitations on the Commission's authority 
to impose Rule 1 02(e) sanctions. Part III examines the Commission's con-
ception of what constitutes improper professional conduct by an account-
ant as announced in its recent Checkosky II opinion. Part IV discusses the 
standards applicable to other situations in which the Commission seeks to 
restrict the ability of an individual to participate in a particular business 
or profession. Part V surveys the other authorities that regulate the pro-
fessionalism of licensed accountants. Part VI summarizes this report and 
sets forth the Task Force's recommendation. 
OVERVIEW OF RULE 102(e) 
PROVISIONS OF THE RULE 
Rule l 02(e) is currently comprised of three main provisions, the relevant 
text of which follows: 
7. In re Checkosky (Checkosky If), Exchange Act Release No. 38,183, 63 S.E.C. Docket 
(CCH) 1691 (Jan. 21, 1997). It should be noted that the Commission did not respond to the 
D.C. Circuit's directive until January 1997, more than two and one-half years after it was 
given and more than 15 years after some of the facts underlying the proceeding occurred. 
8. Checkosky lf, 63 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) at 1700. As will be discussed more thoroughly, 
Commissioner johnson issued a dissenting opinion in which he stated that the Commission 
"should not hold a professional liable for improper professional conduct under Rule 2(e)( I )(ii), 
absent a finding of scienter." /d. at 1705 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). 
9. /d. at I 700. The respondents, Messrs. Checkosky and Aldritch, have since filed a pe-
tition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Checkosky v. SEC, No. 
97-1137(D.C. Cir.filedMar. 17, 1997). 
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(e) Suspension and disbarment. (I) Generally. The Commission may cen-
sure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege 
of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who 
is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hear-
ing in the matter: 
(i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; 
or 
(ii) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in 
unethical or improper professional conduct; or 
(iii) To have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the 
violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the 
rules and regulations thereunder. 
(2) Certain prqfessionals and convicted persons. Any attorney who has been 
suspended or disbarred by a court of the United States or of any 
State; or any person whose license to practice as an accountant, 
engineer, or other professional or expert has been revoked or sus-
pended in any State; or any person who has been convicted of a 
felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude shall be forth-
with suspended from appearing or practicing before the Com-
mission .... 
(3) Temporary suspensions. 
(i) The Commission, with due regard to the public interest and 
without preliminary hearing, may, by order, temporarily sus-
pend from appearing or practicing before it any attorney, 
accountant, engineer, or other professional or expert who has 
been by name: 
(A) Permanently enjoined by any court of competent juris-
diction, by reason of his or her misconduct in an action 
brought by the Commission, from violating or aiding and 
abetting the violation of any provision of the Federal se-
curities laws or of the rules and regulations thereunder; 
or 
(B) Found by any court of competent jurisdiction in an action 
brought by the Commission to which he or she is a party 
... to have violated (unless the violation was found not 
to have been willful) or aided and abetted the violation 
of any provision of the Federal securities laws or of the 
rules and regulations thereunder. 10 
I 0. I 7 C .ER. § 201 .1 02(e). Although the rule is currently comprised of three parts, when 
it was originally adopted in 1935, the sole provision was the current Rule 102(e)(l). Rules 
102(e)(2) and 102(e)(3), whereby the Commission may automatically temporarily suspend a 
professional without notice or a hearing, were added to the Rules of Practice as part of a 
series of amendments adopted in 1970. 
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As previously indicated, Rule 102(e)(l)(ii), pursuant to which the Com-
mission may impose sanctions where it determines a professional has en-
gaged in "improper professional conduct," is the focus of this report. 
IMPACT OF A RULE 1 02(e) SANCTION 
A Rule 102(e) sanction restricts an accountant's ability to "practice be-
fore the Commission." Since at least 1938, when the Commission issued 
its first definition of the concept of "practice before the Commission," its 
interpretation of the activities constituting "practice before the Commis-
sion" has been broad and inclusive." Under Rule 102(D, "practice before 
the Commission" includes, but is not limited to: 
( 1) Transacting any business with the Commission; and 
(2) The preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper by any 
attorney, accountant, engineer, or other professional or expert, 
filed with the Commission in any registration statement, notifi-
cation, application, report or other document with the consent of 
such attorney, accountant, engineer or other professional or ex-
pert.12 
A suspension or bar from practice before the Commission has severe effects 
on an accountant; almost all of his or her work involving a public company, 
whether undertaken as an internal or independent accountant or auditor, 
becomes prohibited conduct. The Commission repeatedly has indicated 
that practice before the Commission as an accountant includes the prep-
aration and review of financial statements, and the assumption of respon-
sibility (when functioning as an accountant) for their preparation and re-
view, !3 as well as the issuance of audit reports. Under these circumstances, 
suspending or barring an accountant from practice before the Commission 
frequently has the practical effect of making it impossible for the account-
II. Although the phrase "practice before the Commission" first appeared in Rule II of 
the Commission's original Rules of Practice, adopted September 13, 1935, see FIRST ANN. 
REP. Of THE SECS. & EXCH. COMM'N 45-46 ( 1935), the Commission first defined this phrase 
in a 1938 revision of its Rules of Practice. See 3 Fed. Reg. 1584 ( 1938). 
12. 17 C .F.R. §201.102(Q. 
13. In a number of orders imposing Rule I 02(e) sanctions against accountants, the Com-
mission has provided that the accountant may, after a designated period of time, apply to 
resume appearing and practicing before the Commission as a preparer or reviewer of finan-
cial statements required to be filed with the Commission, or a person responsible for the 
preparation or review of financial statements required to be filed with the Commission. See, 
e.g., In re Ferraro, Exchange Act Release No. 37,474, 62 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1040 Guly 24, 
1996); In re Stern, Exchange Act Release No. 36,382, 60 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1272 (Oct. 
17, 1995); In re Hoffman, Exchange Act Release No. 33,409, 55 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2174, 
2175 Gan. 4, 1994); In re Schiemann, Exchange Act Release No. 32,983, 55 S.E.C. Docket 
(CCH) 225, 230 (Sept. 29, 1993). 
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ant to work as a public accountant. 14 Although the Commission, in its 
discretion, may merely censure an accountant rather than impose a bar 
or suspension, a censure may carry with it collateral consequences that 
have the same general characteristics as those experienced by accountants 
who are suspended from practice before the Commission. 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A RULE I 02(e) 
SANCTION 
Aside from the direct effects on an accountant's ability to pursue his or 
her profession during the period of the suspension, a Rule 102(e) sanction 
often has significant collateral consequences. 15 A Rule 1 02(e) proceeding 
often is accompanied by publicity that can have an adverse impact on the 
accountant's reputation. 16 Employers might hesitate to employ or promote 
individuals who have been the subject of a Rule 102(e) sanction. Where 
the accountant is an employee, officer, or director of a public company, 
the company might be advised to disclose such a sanction. 17 Indeed, before 
14. See, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (opinion of Randolph, 
CJ.) (stating a proceeding under Rule 2(e) threatens " 'to deprive a person of a way of life 
to which he has devoted years of preparation and on which he and his family have come to 
rely'" (quoting Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind qf Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1297 
(1975)). 
15. Cjjohnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484,488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that a Commission 
order which censured a registered representative and suspended her for six months from 
acting as a supervisor "not only restricted [her] ability to earn a living as a supervisor during 
her six-month suspension, but ... was also likely to have longer-lasting repercussions on her 
ability to pursue her vocation"). 
16. This has become a much greater concern since the 1988 amendments to Rule 1 02(e), 
which reversed the Commission's prior practice by providing that the initiation of all sub-
sequent Rule 102(e) proceedings would be made public unless the Commission otherwise 
ordered. See Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Professionals Appearing or Practicing before 
the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 25,893, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) '\[84,248, at 89,238 Guly 7, 1988) [hereinafter Disciplinary Proceedings Re-
lease]. 
1 7. In 1994, in a release announcing proposed amendments to its rules "that would ex-
pand the types of legal proceedings required to be disclosed in Commission filings," the 
Commission solicited comment as to whether Commission registrants should be required to 
disclose all Rule 102(e) proceedings initiated by the Commission against, among others, any 
of the registrant's executive officers, directors, and persons nominated to become directors. 
Disclosure Concerning Legal Proceedings Involving Management, Promoters, Control Per-
sons and Others, Securities Act Release No. 7106, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,385 (1994). Although the 
Commission has not adopted the proposed rules, in the release it indicated that certain Rule 
l02(e) proceedings should be disclosed: 
Where Rule 2(e) orders relate to violations of the federal securities laws, disclosure would 
be required under both the current and proposed rules. Should the requirements be 
expanded to encompass Rule 2(e) orders based on lack of professional qualifications, 
lack of character or integrity, or unethical or improper professional misconduct, the 
conviction of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, or the disbarment 
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accepting a public company as an audit client, accounting firms almost 
certainly consider the circumstances of any Rule l02(e) sanction against 
the company's senior personnel. Similarly, an underwriter is likely to con-
sider the circumstances of any Rule l 02(e) sanction against the company's 
senior personnel before agreeing to underwrite an offering of the com-
pany's securities. Further, the NASDAQ Stock Market and the stock ex-
changes might consider the circumstances surrounding a Rule l02(e) sanc-
tion against a company's senior personnel in deciding whether to list the 
company's securities. 
AUTHORIZED RULE 102(e) SANCTIONS SERVE ONLY 
REMEDIAL PURPOSES 
Although none of the federal securities statutes expressly authorize the 
Commission to censure, suspend, or disbar professionals from practice 
before the Commission, four federal courts of appeal have specifically up-
held the Commission's authority to promulgate Rule l 02(e) as "reasonably 
related" to the purposes of the federal securities laws. 18 Each of these 
courts has held, however, that the Commission's authority to impose sanc-
tions under Rule l 02(e) is limited by the principle that the sanctions may 
be imposed for the sole purpose of prospectively protecting the Commis-
sion's processes. 19 Stated differently, Rule 102(e) sanctions must serve only 
a remedial, not punitive, purpose. 
While the distinction between "punitive" and "remedial" sanctions has 
or revocation of a license to practice as an attorney, accountant, engineer or other 
expert? 
!d. at 55,391 (footnotes omitted). 
18. Sheldon v. SEC, 45 F.3d 1515, 1518 (lith Cir. 1995) (stating "[w)ejoin the Second 
and Ninth Circuits in rejecting the contention that the SEC's Rule 2(e) is improper"); Chec-
kosky, 23 F. 3d at 455 (opinion of Silberman, CJ.) (adopting reasoning of the Second and 
Ninth Circuits); Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding "(t] he authority 
of the SEC to discipline accountants and bar them from practice before the Commission 
under Rule 2(e) was expressly upheld in a thorough opinion by Judge Timbers of the Second 
Circuit, whose reasoning we adopt") (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d 
Cir. 1979)); Touche Ross & Co., 609 F.2d at 582 (stating Rule I 02(e) " provides the Commission 
with the means to ensure that those professionals, on whom the Commission relies heavily 
in the performance of its statutory duties, perform their tasks diligently and with a reasonable 
degree of competence. As such the Rule is 'reasonably related' to the purposes of the securities 
laws") (citing Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973)). 
19. Sheldon, 45 F. 3d at 1518 (adopting the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuits); 
Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 456 (noting "[t)he Commission had promulgated Rule 2(e) not to aug-
ment its enforcement arsenal but to protect its administrative processes, and the court cor-
rectly recognized that the Commission may not 'usurp the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
to deal with "violations" of the securities laws' ") (quoting Touche Ross & Co., 609 F.2d at 
5 79)) (opinion of Silberman, CJ.); Davy, 792 F.2d at 1421 (adopting reasoning of Second 
Circuit in Touche Ross & Co.); Touche Ross & Co., 609 F.2d at 582 (finding "Rule 2(e) . . . 
represents an attempt by the Commission to protect the integrity of its own processes"). 
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been the topic of some debate in the courts, the Commission recently 
argued, in the context of an appeal of a broker-dealer disciplinary pro-
ceeding, that the test for determining whether a particular sanction is 
punitive or remedial is whether the sanction is for "the purpose of pun-
ishing past misconduct" or "is based on present unfitness."2° In the context 
of Rule I 02(e) proceedings, the Commission and the federal courts have 
articulated the same standard, consistently maintaining that the imposition 
of Rule 1 02(e) sanctions is based on a determination that a professional's 
conduct demonstrates that he or she presents a current threat to the in-
tegrity of the Commission's processes:2 1 
Rule 2(e) proceedings are designed not to punish a person, but to 
protect the integrity of Commission proceedings. In keeping with this 
purpose, the sanctions imposed in a Rule 2(e) proceeding should be 
limited to those sanctions necessary to protect the Commission's pro-
ceedings, such as suspensions or bars from appearing before the Com-
mission.22 
20. Brief of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Respondent, Johnson v. SEC, 
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 1996) (No. 95-1340) [hereinafter SEC Brie8. 
21 . See, e.g., Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the 
Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, reprinted in Securities Law E1iforcement: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on 1/!lecommunications and Fin. qf the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 
on H.R. 9 7 5, 10 I st Con g. I st Sess. 48-49 ( 1989) [hereinafter Commission Memorandum]; 
Checkosky, 23 F. 3d at 493 (stating that "(t]he Commission has the authority to issue Rule 2(e) 
in order to 'protect the integrity of its own processes' (e.g. to assure honest and accurate 
financial filings) by revoking the privileges of professionals whose conduct threatens those 
processes") (Reynolds, DJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Touche Ross & Co., 609 
F.2d at 5 79 (stating that the purpose of Rule I 02(e) is "to preserve the integrity of its own 
procedures, by assuring the fitness of those professionals who represent others before the 
Commission"); see also Davy, 792 F.2d at 1421. 
22. Commission Memorandum, supra note 21, at 49. At the time the Commission sub-
mitted its memorandum, Congress was considering the possibility of expanding the Com-
mission's authority under Rule 102(e) by granting it the ability to impose civil monetary 
penalties in such proceedings. In the memorandum, the Commission specifically argued 
against the opportunity, stating: "[p]aying a penalty will not make a professional fit to practice 
before the commission. Rather, penalties serve enforcement goals of punishing past miscon-
duct and deterring future misconduct." /d.; see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 
(1989). In Halper, a case relating to the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibition on multiple 
punishments, the U.S. Supreme Court observed: 
[T]he determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the rele-
vant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes 
that the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal 
sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case 
serves the goals of punishment. 
These goals are familiar. We have recognized in other contexts that punishment serves 
the twin aims of retribution and deterrence .... From these premises, it follows that a 
civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather 
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To this end, the federal courts and the Commission have emphasized that 
Rule l02(e) is not an additional weapon in the Commission's enforcement 
arsenal, but is rather a means of protecting the Commission's processes if 
a professional's prior activities demonstrate he or she poses a current threat 
to those processes. 23 
RECENT RULE 102(e) PROCEEDINGS 
The Task Force shares the views of the federal courts and the Com-
mission that Rule l02(e) sanctions should serve solely a remedial purpose. 
The Task Force believes, however, that the lack of clearly defined standards 
for what constitutes improper professional conduct has, in many cases, led 
to the inappropriate employment of Rule l02(e) to punish prior alleged 
failures by accountants to comply with professional standards, rather than 
to protect the Commission's processes from individuals found to present a 
current threat to the integrity of those processes. The Commission's re-
cently issued Checkosky II opinion provides not only a discussion, but also 
an example, of the difficulties facing both the Commission and the ac-
counting profession relating to the proper use of Rule l 02(e). 
IN RE CHECKOSKY 
In the Commission's opinion in Checkosky I,24 which preceded the court 
of appeals decision previously described, the Commission found that 
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punish-
ment, as we have come to understand the term. 
!d. at 448. Thus, because authorized Rule 102(e) sanctions must serve only a remedial pur-
pose, a Rule 102(e) sanction may not also carry a retributive or deterrent purpose. The Task 
Force recognizes, however, that, even without a deterrent purpose, the imposition of a Rule 
I 02(e) sanction on an individual accountant may have the iffoct of deterring similar conduct 
by other accountants. The Task Force does not believe that the mere existence of such a 
deterrent effect transforms what would otherwise be a remedial Rule I 02(e) sanction, a fortiori, 
into a punitive sanction. 
23. See, e.g., Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 493 (noting that "Rule 2(e) is separate from the SEC's 
arsenal against violations of the Act's substantive provisions, because suspensions under the 
Rule are necessary to aid the Commission in the regulation and administration of the Act") 
(Reynolds, DJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted); Touche Ross & 
Co., 609 F.2d at 579. The Touche Ross & Co. court stated: 
[i]ndeed, the Commission has made it clear that its intent in promulgating Rule 2(e) 
was not to utilize the rule as an additional weapon in its enforcement arsenal, but rather 
to determine whether a person's professional qualifications, including his character and 
integrity, are such that he is fit to appear and practice before the Commission. 
/d.; if. In re Carter, Securities Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,847, at 84,149 (Feb. 28, 1981) (determining that the purpose of Rule 102(e) 
is to "protect the integrity of [the Commission's] processes .... [and not] the creation of new 
administrative proceedings to fill gaps in the Commission's current statutory panoply of 
remedies"). 
24. In re Checkosky (Checkosky 1), Exchange Act Release No. 31,094, 52 S.E.C. Docket 
(CCH) 1122 (Aug. 26, 1992). 
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"proof of bad faith or willful misconduct is not a prerequisite for the im-
position of sanctions pursuant to Rule 2(e)(l)(ii) of the Commission's Rules 
of Practice. "25 In Checkosky I, the Commission determined that two audi-
tors had incorrectly interpreted GAAP and had violated GAAS by failing 
to: (i) qualify their opinion as to whether the issuer's financial statements 
were prepared in accordance with GAAP, (ii) conduct the audit with suf-
ficient skepticism and due care, and (iii) obtain sufficient competent evi-
dential matter to support their opinion.26 Although the Commission char-
acterized the auditors' conduct as reckless, the Commission asserted, in 
finding that the auditors had engaged in "improper professional conduct," 
that "a mental awareness greater than negligence is not required to impose 
sanctions against an accountant pursuant to Rule 2(e)."27 
A challenge to the Commission's order ensued. As previously noted, a 
panel of judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit deter-
mined that it was unclear whether the Commission had applied a negli-
gence standard in finding that the auditors had engaged in improper pro-
fessional conduct.28 Indeed, one of the judges indicated that the 
Commission's prior Rule l02(e) decisions demonstrated that the Com-
mission had never been clear about what standard of conduct should give 
rise to a l02(e) sanction.29 Accordingly, the matter was remanded, with 
instructions for the Commission to clarify the standard of conduct, and 
how it applied to the case. 30 
In its response, the majority of the Commission began by reiterating 
and explaining its conclusion that the auditors' conduct had been "reck-
less."31 Thus, a finding as to whether the respondents had been negligent, 
and whether negligent conduct alone was a sufficient basis for a finding 
of sanctionable improper professional conduct, was unnecessary to a de-
cision in the proceeding. Nevertheless, the Commission took the occasion 
to point out that Rule 102(e) is a means by which the Commission holds 
" 'those professionals who practice before us to generally recognized norms 
25. !d. at 1123. 
26. /d. at 1131-32. 
27. /d. at 1132 (quoting Carter, (1981 Transfer Binder] .Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,150 
(finding a sanction under Rule l02(e) is "limited to that necessary to protect the investing 
public and the Commission from the future impact on its processes of professional miscon-
duct")). 
28. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
29. Chcckosky v. SEC, 23 E3d 452, 462 (stating that the Commission has "variously 
indicated that different levels of mental culpability are needed" to make out a Rule 102(e) 
violation) (opinion of Silberman, CJ.). 
30. /d. at 454 (per curiam). 
31. In re Chcckosky (Checkosky II), Exchange Act Release No. 38,183, 63 S.E.C. Docket 
(CCH) 1691, 1696 Qan. 21, 1997). The Commission noted that recklessness has been defined 
as "not merely a form of ordinary negligence; it is an 'extreme departure from the standards 
of ordinary care, which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known 
to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.'" /d. at 1696 
n.23 (quoting SEC v. Steadman, 967 E2d 636, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
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of professional conduct .... To do so upsets no justifiable expectations, 
since the professional is already subject to those norms.' In the case of 
accountants, those standards include GAAS and GAAP."32 Examining the 
conduct of accountants in light of these standards, the Commission stated 
that it had, in the past, "found improper professional conduct committed 
under circumstances evidencing a variety of mental states. "33 Improper 
professional conduct by accountants thus "encompasses a range of con-
duct,"34 including not just willful acts of malfeasance, but also conduct 
that is "incompetent or unethical,"35 even conduct that was the result of 
mental and physical exhaustion. 36 Given these precedents, the Commis-
sion deduced that "varying degrees of care or mental state" could give rise 
to Rule 1 02( e) sanctions.37 
As for the specific question of whether negligent conduct could give rise 
to a Rule 102(e) sanction, the Commission conceded that its processes 
"are not necessarily threatened by innocent or even certain careless mis-
takes."38 Indeed, the majority emphasized that it wished to "make clear" 
that "the fact that GAAP and GAAS are professional standards against 
which we measure the conduct of accountants does not mean that every 
deviation from GAAP and GAAS is improper professional conduct war-
ranting discipline" under Rule 102(e).39 Nonetheless, the Commission 
warned that Rule 102(e) "does not mandate a particular mental state ... 
negligent actions by a professional may, under certain circumstances, con-
stitute improper professional conduct. "40 
The majority deliberately declined to identify the "certain circum-
stances" of nonreckless or nonintentional conduct that would warrant 
sanctions, except to briefly describe several broad areas of deficiency, lack 
of independence, misapplication of GAAP, lack of skepticism, lack of fac-
tual basis for an opinion, and failure to perform auditing procedures, that 
had in the past been instances in which it had imposed sanctions. Indeed, 
the majority indicated that, while repeated "mistakes" could give rise to 
sanctions, "isolated failures may be so serious as to warrant discipline," 
32. Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C . Docket (CCH) at 1699-1700 (footnote omitted) (quoting Carter, 
[1981 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,148). 
33. Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) at 1699. 
34. !d. at 1700 (stating "we have not hesitated to sanction auditors for such conduct"). 
35. !d. (quoting Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,148 (finding 
"[a]n incompetent or unethical practitioner has the ability to inflict substantial damage on 
the Commission's processes, and thus the investing public") (quoting In re Keating, Muething 
& Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) '\182,124, at 81,991 Gu1y 2, 1979) (Williams, Chairman, concurring)). 
36. Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) at 170 I . 
37. !d. 
38. !d. at I 703. 
39. !d. 
40. !d. at 1700. 
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even where the isolated failure is merely "careless and unprofessional."41 
As such, the Commission stated that its "conclusions about the propriety 
of particular professional conduct are driven by the impact on Commission 
processes of the specific facts presented in a given proceeding before us." 42 
Commissioner Johnson filed a separate opinion, dissenting from the 
majority's conclusion that accountants could be sanctioned under Rule 
I 02(e) " based on conduct that is merely negligent."43 In Commissioner 
Johnson's view, the Commission should impose Rule 102(e) sanctions "only 
when it is demonstrated that [the professional] acted with scienter."44 Ac-
cording to Commissioner Johnson: 
A professional often must make difficult decisions, navigating through 
complex statutory and regulatory requirements, and, in the case of 
accountants, complying with [GAAS] and applying [GAAP]. These 
determinations require the application of independent professional 
judgment and sometimes involve matters of first impression. For this 
reason, I believe that an earlier Commission was correct to assert 
that, if a professional is to exercise his or her "Best independent judg-
ment . .. [the professional] must have the freedom to make inno-
cent-or even, in certain cases, careless-mistakes without fear of 
Qosing] the ability to practice before" us.45 
Commissioner Johnson further emphasized that the Commission should 
exercise "an appropriate degree" of self restraint:46 
I simply do not believe that we should recast negligent violations of 
an accounting standard as improper professional conduct. .. . That 
41. /d. at l 703. The Commission cited one case intended to support this proposition, In 
re Bollt & Shapiro, 38 S.E.C. 815, 823 (1959). Bollt & Shapiro involved a two-partner accounting 
firm in which one partner, Shapiro (whose conduct the Commission characterized as " care-
less and unprofessional"), reported on the financial statements of a client even though the 
other partner, Bollt, was the promoter, principal officer, and controlling shareholder of the 
client, a clear violation of independence rules. In that proceeding, the Commission found 
that, even though Shapiro had been concerned about his independence, he relied on the 
opinion of the client's lawyer (who was himself an officer and director of the client) that he 
was qualified to certify the client's financial statements. Such extreme indifference to inde-
pendence requirements would seem to constitute reckless conduct, not mere negligence. 
42. Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) at 1700. 
43. /d. at 1704 (opinion of Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Johnson also 
questioned the "appropriateness of disciplining the respondents considering the age of this 
proceeding." /d. 
44. /d. 
45. /d. (quoting In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,847, at 84,167 (Feb. 28, 1981)) (alterations in original). Com-
missioner Johnson reiterated the concern expressed in Carter that a negligence standard would 
"impair the relationships" between accountants and their clients, and hinder "our system of 
truthful and accurate disclosure." /d. (stating that professionals" 'motivated by fears for their 
personal liability will not be consulted on difficult issues ' ") (quoting Carter, [1981 Transfer 
Binder), a t 84,167). 
46. /d. 
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is not an appropriate role for this Commission. Difficult ethical and 
professional responsibility concerns are generally matters most ap-
propriately dealt with by professional organizations or, in certain 
cases, malpractice litigation. Nor do I believe that mere misjudgments 
or negligence establishes either professional incompetence warranting 
Commission disciplinary action or the likelihood of future danger to 
the Commission's processes.47 
As indicated by Commissioner Johnson, the Commission's determina-
tion to apply a negligence standard in Rule 102(e) proceedings raises 
doubts as to how a negligent auditor, whose conduct has already been 
completed, poses a threat to the Commission's processes. The Task Force 
believes that the Commission's willingness to rely on an accountant or 
auditor's past conduct as the sole basis for the imposition of a Rule l02(e) 
sanction presents a potentially serious problem for the continued validity 
of Rule I 02(e), particularly where the past conduct is merely negligent. 
Indeed, as CircuitJudge Silberman emphasized in his opinion in Checkosky: 
If the Commission were to determine that an accountant's negligence 
is a per se violation of Rule 2(e), it would have to consider not only 
the administrative burden such a position would entail but also 
whether it would constitute a de focto substantive regulation of the 
profession and thus raise questions as to the legitimacy of Rule 
2(e)(l)(ii)-or at least its scope.48 
Whether one agrees with the majority's position that state of mind is 
not determinative of whether to find improper professional conduct, or 
Commissioner Johnson's view that scienter is required, the Task Force be-
lieves that the criteria discussed in the Checkosky opinions fail to address 
what should be the central focus of a disciplinary proceeding: whether, 
taking into account all of the facts concerning a respondent, including his 
or her past conduct and current circumstances, the respondent poses a cur-
rent threat of foture conduct harmful to the Commission's processes. In a 
variety of other contexts, the Commission seeks to preclude individuals 
who are alleged to have engaged in past misconduct from engaging, in the 
future, in particular professional pursuits. The standards articulated as 
applicable in determining whether to impose sanctions in these contexts 
47. /d. at 1705. 
48. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F. 3d 452, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Such substantive regulation of 
the accounting profession by the Commission would run contrary to the clearly stated intent 
of Congress, which, more than 30 years ago, stripped the authority of federal agencies to 
impose their own admissions standards on professionals practicing before them. See H .R. 
REP. No. 89-1141, at 4173 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4170, 4173 (stating that 
"there is a presumption that members in good standing of the professions of the law and 
certified public accountancy are of good moral character, and that surveillance by State bar 
associations and State associations of certified public accounts [sic] will sufficiently insure the 
integrity of practice by such persons" ). 
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provide a model for the manner in which the Commission should deter-
mine whether to impose sanctions in the Rule 1 02(e) context. 
STANDARDS APPLIED BY THE COMMISSION IN 
IMPOSING SUSPENSIONS AND BARS IN ITS 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND SEEKING 
COURT-ORDERED SUSPENSIONS AND BARS 
Under the Exchange Act, the Commission has the authority to suspend 
or bar persons from associating with broker-dealers. Similarly, under the 
Exchange Act, the Commission has the authority to seek a court-ordered 
suspension or bar precluding a person from serving as an officer or director 
of a public company for the period of the suspension. In each of these 
situations, the Commission or a court is required to determine whether 
the person in question presents a current threat to the public, such that a 
suspension or bar is necessary to protect the public from future wrong-
doing.49 
49. Consideration by the Commission of the need to protect the public from the likelihood 
of future wrongdoing is not limited to the question of suspensions and bars. The issue has 
been analyzed repeatedly by courts in the context of requests for injunctive relief in actions 
brought by the Commission. Courts generally award permanent injunctions where the Com-
mission has established a past violation and made a proper showing that "a reasonable 
likelihood exists" that future violations would occur absent an injunction. See, e.g., SEC v. 
Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 144 (7th Cir. 1982). In determining whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a recurrence, courts have considered a number of factors including: (i) the 
egregiousness of the violations; (ii) the isolated or repeated nature of the violations; (iii) the 
degree of scienter involved; (iv) the sincerity of the defendant's assurances, if any, against 
future violations; (v) the defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct; (vi) 
opportunities presented (or lack thereoD by the defendant's occupation for future violations; 
(vii) the defendant's age and health; (viii) the time elapsed since the violation; and (ix) the 
severe economic and professional consequences that an injunction can have on a defendant. 
See, e.g., SEC v. Pros Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 767, 769 (lOth Cir. 1993); SEC v. Washington 
County Uti!. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 227 (6th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 
546 F.2d l 044, I 048 (2d Cir. 1976). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that, 
to establish a likelihood of future misconduct, it will almost always be necessary for the 
Commission to demonstrate that the defendant's past misconduct was the result of more 
than negligence. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 702 (1980) (stating "[t]he Court of 
Appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunction in this case in the misapprehension that it 
was not necessary to find scienter in order to support an injunction under[§ 17(a)(l) of the 
1933 Act, § I O(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule I Ob-5 promulgated thereunder]"); see also id. at 
703 (Burger,]., concurring) (opining that "[t]o make such a showing, it will almost always be 
necessary for the Commission to demonstrate that the defendant's past sins have been the 
result of more than negligence"). 
Although the Commission has asserted, without citation, that "the standards for fraud or 
for injunctive relief'have no bearing' on Rule 2(e)(l)(ii) proceedings," Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C. 
Docket (CCH) at 1700 n.S I (citing In re Checkosky (Checkosky !), 52 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 
1122, 1133 n.38 (1992)), the Task Force believes, as previously indicated, that, because a 
consideration of the need to protect the public from the likelihood of future wrongdoing is 
common to each of these contexts, the carefully developed standards applied in the fraud 
and injunctive relief contexts (as well as the similar standards applied in the other contexts 
discussed below) provide a model for the imposition of sanctions in the Rule I 02(e) context. 
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CENSURES, SUSPENSIONS, AND BARS FROM ASSOCIATION 
WITH A BROKER-DEALER 
Under the Exchange Act, the Commission may censure, suspend, or 
bar a person from associating with a broker-dealer or place limitations on 
the activities or functions of such person, if the Commission finds that the 
person engaged in specified misconduct and that a sanction would serve 
the public interest.50 The Commission recently took the position that the 
purpose of this provision is not to punish a person for past misconduct, but 
rather to protect the public from persons who are currently unfit and pose 
a threat to the public: 
[T] he purpose of this proceeding is not to punish past misconduct 
but to protect the public from future harm by unfit persons. Com-
mission proceedings under §§ 15(b) and 19(h) are meant to assure the 
integrity and competence of the securities industry professionals on 
whom public investors rely. Evidence of past misconduct is relevant 
in such a proceeding to the extent it sheds light on current fitness and 
likely future behavior.5 1 
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in]ohnson 
v. SEC provides a clear articulation of the standards applied in determining 
whether an individual should be suspended or barred from association 
with a broker-dealer. 52 The issue in Johnson was whether an order censuring 
and suspending a broker-dealer's branch manager from acting as a super-
visor for six months should be deemed a civil penalty or a remedial sanc-
tion. 53 In arguing that the order imposing the censure and suspension was 
not a civil penalty, the Commission recognized that the test for whether a 
license suspension or revocation is punitive or remedial is whether the 
suspension or revocation is for the "purpose of punishing past misconduct" 
or "is based on present unfitness."54 The Commission argued that the 
50. Exchange Act§ 15(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (1994). 
51. See SEC Brief, supra note 20, at 4. The Commission also stated that "[t]he overarching 
purpose of these provisions, as reflected in the public interest requirement, is to protect the 
public from persons who are professionally unfit." !d. at 22. 
52. 87 F. 3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Following this decision, the Commission filed a motion 
for an en bane hearing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which denied the 
motion. The Solicitor General of the United States subsequently refused to give the Com-
mission permission to seek certiorari. 
53. This characterization was relevant for the purposes of determining whether the Com-
mission's action was timely commenced because 28 U.S. C. § 2462 provides a five-year limi-
tations period for proceedings brought to enforce any "civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pe-
cuniary or otherwise." 
54. See In re]ohnson, Exchange Act Release No. 35,698, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) '1!85,624, at 86,617 (May 10, 1995) (determining that "[t]he proceeding 
before us does not seek to impose a civil penalty, but rather to determine the appropriate 
remedial action. The intent of johnson's suspension is to protect the public from future harm 
at her hands"); see also SEC Brief, supra note 20, at 4. 
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suspension of Ms. Johnson was remedial because it was rooted in her 
present unfitness. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disagreed, holding that 
the order imposing the censure and suspension on Ms. Johnson was a 
penalty. 55 In particular, the court objected to the lack of evidence dem-
onstrating Ms. Johnson's present unfitness, noting that the order imposing 
the censure and suspension "would less resemble punishment if the SEC 
had focused on Johnson's current competence or the degree of risk she 
posed to the public."56 Thus, both the Commission and the court seemed 
to agree that a truly remedial suspension or bar would be based on present 
unfitness, and the court further suggested that past misconduct alone 
would be insufficient to demonstrate that unfitness.57 The Commission's 
view in this context is entirely consistent with the view it holds with regard 
to suspensions and bars of officers and directors. 
OFFICER AND DIRECTOR SUSPENSIONS AND BARS 
Under section 20(e) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and 
Exchange Act section 21 ( d)(2), 58 a federal court may suspend or bar a 
defendant from serving as an officer or director of a public company at 
the Commission's request where the court finds that (i) the defendant has 
violated either Securities Act section 17(a)(l) or Exchange Act section 
10(b), and (ii) the defendant's "conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness 
to serve as an officer or director."59 The Commission obtained explicit 
statutory authority to seek court orders suspending or barring individuals 
from serving as officers and directors of public companies with the enact-
ment of the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform 
Act of 1990.60 In testifying in support of the suspension or bar authority, 
then-Commission Chairman Richard Breeden told Congress that the 
Commission would seek the remedy "only in those cases ... that involve 
egregious fraudulent conduct."61 
55. Johnson, 87 E3d at 491-92. 
56. /d. at 489. 
57. Cj Steadman v. SEC, 603 E2d 1126, 1141 (5th Cir. 1979), qff'd, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) 
(stating that "[i] t would be a gross abuse of discretion to bar an investment adviser from the 
industry on the basis of isolated negligent violations"). 
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2). 
59. !d. 
60. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, § 101, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t). 
61. The Securities Law on Eriforcement Remedies qf 1989: Hearing Bifore the Subcomm. on Sees. qf 
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Aifoirs, lO l st Con g. 29 ( 1990) (statement of 
Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC). 
The report of the so-called "Treadway Commission," issued in October 1987, made the 
initial recommendation that Congress grant the Commission the authority to suspend or bar 
corporate officers and directors. See generally SEC, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING (Oct. 1987). In written testimony to Congress 
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The first courts to consider whether an officer should be suspended or 
barred under these provisions have applied a list of factors first enunciated 
by Professor Jayne W Barnard in 1992:62 "(1) the 'egregiousness' of the 
underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant's 'repeat offender' 
status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or position when he engaged in the fraud; 
(4) the defendant's degree of scienter; (5) the defendant's economic stake 
in the violation; and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur. "63 
OTHER AUTHORITIES REGULATING THE 
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES OF ACCOUNTANTS 
A "substantial unfitness" standard would not operate in a vacuum. A 
variety of other public and private entities regulate both the accounting 
profession and the professionalism of licensed accountants. These entities 
have procedures in place for policing the accounting profession and sys-
tems designed to ensure the integrity of accountants practicing before the 
Commission. 64 
regarding the genesis of the idea, former SEC Commissioner James Treadway, who chaired 
the Treadway Commission, stated: 
First, the independent auditor, who in (the Treadway] Commission's view is secondarily 
responsible for accurate financial statements is subject to bars and suspensions. \·Vhy, we 
asked, should those with primary responsibility-management of the issuer-be subject 
to lesser sanctions? Second, when you survey the field of those subject to the SEC's 
reach who are subject to bars and suspensions-broker dealers and those associated 
with them, investment companies and those associated with them, independent ac-
countants and those associated with them, and professionals practicing before the 
SEC-why is it that officers and directors of reporting companies are not subject to 
the same sanctions? 
Securities Law Enforcement Hearing Bifore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fin. qf the House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 975, JOist Gong. 99 (1989) (statement of James C. 
Treadway, Comm'r, SEC). The Task Force believes that, while officers and directors of public 
companies are now subject to the same sanctions, the standards applied by the Commission 
in determining whether an officer or director should be barred and whether an auditor should 
be barred remain unjustifiably different. 
62. J ayne W Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve?", 70 N.C. L. 
REV. 1489, 1492-93 (1992). 
63. SEC v. Shah, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,374, at 
90,592 (S.D.N.Y July 28, 1993); see also SEC v. Patel, 61 F. 3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (ap-
proving the application of these factors in making "the unfitness assessment"). These factors 
are largely based on those applied in determining whether to grant the Commission an 
injunction against future violations of the federal securities laws, as well as those factors 
discussed in Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979). 
64. As Congress recently observed in the legislative history of the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995: 
The Conference Committee expects that the SEC will continue its long-standing prac-
tice of looking to the private sector to set and to improve auditing standards. The SEC 
should not act to "modify" or "supplement" generally accepted auditing standards for 
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AICPA REGULATION 
Since 1977, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) has administered a quality control and peer review program for 
members of its SEC Practice Section (Section). Members of the Section 
include most of the firms nationwide that audit " SEC clients," the Sec-
tion's term for companies making an initial filing under the Securities Act 
or any registrant that files periodic reports with the Commission under the 
Exchange Act (except brokers or dealers registered only because of section 
l5(a) of the Exchange Act). The Section has established the Quality Con-
trol Inquiry Committee, which investigates specific allegations concerning 
the professional conduct of Section members in auditing SEC clients. In 
addition, the Section's Peer Review Program examines selected audits to 
determine whether they were conducted properly and in accordance with 
the firm 's and the profession's quality control standards. If the Section's 
Peer Review Committee finds that an audit was not done in accordance 
with GAAS or that financial statements were not prepared in accordance 
with GAAP, the firm is expected to take appropriate corrective action. If 
the firm does not do so, the Section's Executive Committee is empowered 
to impose sanctions, which have included: (i) corrective measures by the 
firm, including measures involving personnel; (ii) additional continuing 
professional education; (iii) accelerated or special peer reviews; (iv) ad-
monishments, censures, or reprimands; (v) suspension from membership 
in the Section; or (vi) expulsion from Section membership. 
Finally, all members of the AICPA are subject to that organization's 
Code of Professional Conduct (Code). Members found to have violated 
any of the rules contained, or any standards referred to, in the Code may 
be subject to sanction; the maximum sanction is expulsion from member-
ship. Expulsion from AICPA or a state CPA society membership, however, 
has no effect on the person's license to practice as an accountant.65 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
State Licensing Authorities 
Every state and U.S. territory has some form of licensing authority that 
governs the certification or licensing of public accountants within its juris-
diction. These authorities may, in compliance with applicable procedures, 
suspend or revoke the license of an accountant who fails to meet that state's 
standards of conduct. Typical grounds for disciplinary actions against ac-
SEC registrants until after it has determined that the private sector is unable or unwilling 
to do so on a timely basis. 
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 47-48 (1995). 
65 . DENZIL Y. CAUSEY, jR. & SANDRA A. CAUSEY, DUT IES AND LIABIUTIES OF PUBUC 
ACCOUNTANTS 78 (5th ed. 1995). 
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countants include "gross negligence,"66 "unprofessional conduct,"67 "dis-
creditable conduct,"68 "dishonesty in the practice of public accounting,"69 
prior suspension before a governmental body or agency, 70 failure to comply 
with GAAS,71 or conviction of a crime. 72 
Proceedings to suspend or revoke an accountant's license must afford 
the licensee at least minimum due process. A person facing license revo-
cation must have access to all documents considered by the hearing officer 
and licensing board, for example,73 and must be provided "a definite 
charge, adequate notice, and a full, fair and impartial hearing. " 74 Typically, 
judicial review is available. 
Other Commission Sanctions Applicable to Accountants 
The Commission has a number of enforcement measures available that 
it can apply to accountants whose conduct it determines warrants the 
imposition of sanctions. These measures demonstrate that the Commission 
has great flexibility to address conduct that it deems objectionable. For 
example, the Commission may issue orders requiring a respondent to cease 
and desist from violating now, or in the future, any provision of the federal 
66. Eisenberg v. Educ. Dep't, 510 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (App. Div. 1986) (revoking an ac-
countant's license where, in auditing a company with poor records and no internal controls, 
he failed to prepare an audit program or submit an internal control questionnaire). 
67. Preusch v. University of N.Y., 490 N.Y.S.2d 927, 929 (App. Div. 1985) (confirming 
determination to revoke an accountant's license where he orchestrated a client's loans to 
companies in which he had a financial interest). 
68. Gurry v. Board of Pub. Accountancy, 474 N.E.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Mass. 1985) (affirm-
ing two-year suspension and holding that statutory language was sufficiently specific to with-
stand constitutional challenge). 
69. Arnold v. Board of Accountancy, 619 P.2d 912, 913-17 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming 
revocation of an accountant's license where he overcharged clients and falsified billings); 
Keene v. Board of Accountancy, 894 P.2d 582, 587-88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming 
revocation of license where accountant: (i) induced an elderly client to make a loan to the 
accountant's corporation, (ii) made an unsecured loan of the client's money to a friend of the 
accountant, and (iii) withdrew funds from the client's account without informing the client). 
70. Compare Clare v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 481, 485-89 (Ct. App. 
1992) (affirming license suspension based on prior suspension by Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board), with Thomas v. Board of Accountancy, 702 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) 
(reversing revocation of the petitioner's license where he had been disbarred). 
71. Christensen v. Wyoming Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 838 P.2d 723, 725-28 
(Wyo. 1992) (affirming reprimand). 
72. Ashe v. Department of Prof'! Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 467 So. 2d 814, 814-
15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming revocation of an accountant's certificate where he 
had been convicted of trafficking in false and forged securities). 
73. Christiansen v. Missouri State Bd. of Accountancy, 764 S.W.2d 952, 953-57 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1988) (reversing revocation of an accountant's license for failure of board to make 
documents available to accountant). 
74. WILLIAM OTIS MORRIS, REVOCATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSES BY GOVERN-
MENTAL AGENCIES 66 ( 1984). 
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securities laws. 75 The Commission may also order a respondent to comply 
or take steps to effect compliance with provisions of the federal securities 
laws upon such terms and conditions and within such time as the Com-
mission may specify. Moreover, the Commission may seek a federal court 
order enjoining violations of the federal securities laws. 76 If a defendant 
profited from his or her misconduct, the Commission may seek a federal 
court order requiring such person to disgorge any profit obtained as a 
result of the violation, 77 and, in addition, may also seek from the federal 
court the imposition of civil penalties against the defendant. 78 
SANCTIONS IMPOSED IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
It is not uncommon for courts in criminal cases to condition the avail-
ability of probation on the defendant's willingness to forego certain types 
of employment or to disengage himself from a particular working envi-
ronment. Where the defendant is an accountant and has been convicted 
of a crime, it may be appropriate for a court to condition the availability 
of probation on the defendant's agreement to wind up his accounting 
business and to refrain from performing general accounting services for 
the term of his probation. This condition was imposed by the trial judge 
and upheld by the appellate court in State v. Graham, 79 a case in which the 
75. The Commission may enter an administrative cease-and-desist order against: (i) any 
person that is, was, or is about to violate any provision of the federal securities laws; and (ii) 
any person "that is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the 
person knew or should have known would contribute to such violation." See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7 7h-l (a) ( 1994). The legislative history of the Remedies Act, by which the Commission was 
granted the authority to enter such cease-and-desist orders, noted that it would be appropriate 
for the Commission to use the cease-and-desist remedy against persons "who commit isolated 
infractions and present a lesser threat to investors," and to avoid protracted litigation or 
settlement negotiations resulting from concerns regarding the severe collateral consequences 
that arise from an injunction. S. REP. No. 101-337 (1990); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-616 
(1990). 
76. The most frequently invoked provision is 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d), which authorizes the 
Commission to bring an action in district court "[w]henever it shall appear ... that any 
person is engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute ... a 
violation of the [Exchange Act] or of any rule, regulation, or order thereunder." See also id. 
§§ 77t(b), 79r(e), 80a-4l(d), 80b-9(d), 77uuu. 
77. See, e.g., SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993); SEC v. First City Fin. 
Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
78. For example, for insider trading and tipping cases, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act 
of 1984 authorized the Commission to seek, and the courts to impose, a penalty of up to 
three times the profit gained or loss avoided. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified at 
15 U.S. C. § 78u-l (a)). For all other violations of the federal securities laws, the Securities 
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 authorized the Commission 
to seek, and the courts to impose, civil penalties on a natural person of up to $100,000 or, if 
greater, the gross gain to the defendant. Pub. L. No. I 01-429, § I 0 I, I 04 Stat. 931 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)). 
79. State v. Graham, 633 N.E.2d 622, 624-25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
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defendant-accountant had sold unregistered securities to several of his cli-
ents. Similar conditions to probation may be imposed in other circum-
stances, creating the practical effect of a temporary suspension of the ac-
countant's license. 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE TASK FORCE 
The Task Force believes that the test for deciding whether to impose a 
censure, suspension, or bar pursuant to Rule 1 02(e) for improper profes-
sional conduct on independent public accountants should be a determi-
nation of whether the accountant presents a current threat of future mis-
conduct harmful to the Commission's processes.BO We believe the existing 
regime regarding officer and director suspensions and bars and suspen-
sions and bars from association with broker-dealers provides the appro-
priate model for this determination. Each of these types of suspensions 
and bars prevents a person from pursuing a particular livelihood in the 
future, prohibiting activities that go beyond the dealings with the particular 
business entity that gave rise to the sanctions, indeed, prohibiting what 
would otherwise be Legal conduct. Given these similarities, we believe that 
the application of differing standards by which accountants may be sanc-
tioned cannot be justified. The application of similar standards in the Rule 
l02(e) context would provide consistency, predictability, and results far 
superior to that which has been the case in recent years, and which has 
raised so much understandable concern. 
Accordingly, the Task Force recommends that the Commission impose 
a Rule l02(e) sanction for improper professional conduct only upon a 
finding by the Commission that the accountant is presently "substantially 
unfit" to practice before the Commission. While we believe that the Com-
mission is justified in expressing concern regarding instances of past neg-
ligent conduct by accountants, we believe that, in determining whether to 
impose a Rule l02(e) sanction on an accountant, the Commission must 
consider much more than the mere existence of past negligent conduct. 
Rather, we believe that a finding of "substantial unfitness" requires that 
the Commission examine the accountant's alleged misconduct, subsequent 
behavior, and current circumstances. 
Specifically, the Commission ought to consider and expressly discuss the 
egregiousness of the underlying conduct, whether the conduct involved an 
isolated failure or was part of a continuing pattern of misconduct, the 
80. Many public companies employ accountants to prepare the financial statements that 
the company files with the Commission. A Rule I 02(e) sanction, as applied to such employees, 
is a de facto form of regulation of employees of public companies. The imposition of such a 
de facto officer and director bar is suspect, especially in light of the 1990 statutory provision 
pursuant to which the Commission must seek federal court approval to impose a bar against 
service as an officer or director of a publicly held company. See supra note 60 and accompa-
nying text. 
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accountant's "role" or position when he or she engaged in the conduct, 
the accountant's degree of scienter, and the accountant's economic stake 
in the violation.81 These issues must be evaluated in light of the likelihood 
of the misconduct to recur. In this regard, the Commission should take 
into account such factors as: (i) where appropriate, whether the accountant 
has pursued educational measures to correct deficiencies in his or her 
conduct; (ii) whether the accountant's employer has disciplined the ac-
countant; (iii) whether there is heightened firm supervision of the account-
ant; (iv) whether the accountant has engaged in additional misconduct; 
and (v) the current employment status of the accountant. 
The Task Force believes that focusing on these factors will, in general, 
eliminate the concern shared by many ethical, competent accountants that 
a single act or judgment, deemed not to comply with professional stan-
dards (and, therefore, arguably negligent) by the Commission, could cause 
them to lose their ability to engage in their profession. Accountants often 
audit numerous public companies in a single year, and each audit is fraught 
with numerous procedures and judgment calls: 
an audit report is not a simple statement of verifiable fact that . .. 
can be easily checked against uniform standards of indisputable ac-
curacy. Rather, an audit report is a professional opinion based on 
numerous and complex factors ... . The report is based on the au-
ditor's interpretation and application of hundreds of professional 
standards, many of which are broadly phrased and readily subject to 
different constructions. Although ultimately expressed in shorthand 
form, the report is the final product of a complex process involving 
discretion and judgment on the part of the auditor at every stage. 
Using different initial assumptions and approaches, different sam-
81. These factors are largely based on those discussed in Steadman, where the owner of an 
investment adviser appealed the Commission's imposition of an order permanently barring 
him from associating with any investment adviser or affiliating with any registered investment 
company. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit held 
that, when the Commission imposes the most drastic sanctions at its disposal, it must artic-
ulate carefully the grounds for its decision. In that context, the court observed, "[t)o say that 
past misconduct gives rise to an inference of future misconduct is not enough. What is 
required is a specific enumeration of the factors in Steadman's case that merit permanent 
exclusion." ld. Among the factors that the court held the Commission should specifically 
consider are: 
the egregiousness of the defendant's actions, the isolated or recurrent nature of the 
infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the defendant's assurances 
against future violations, the defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature of his con-
duct, and the likelihood that the defendant's occupation will present opportunities for 
future violations. 
!d. (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 n.29 (5th Cir. 1978)); see also supra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
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piing techniques, and the wisdom of20-20 hindsight, few CPA audits 
would be immune from criticism. 82 
In short, even competent and ethical accountants may engage at least once 
in conduct that, in retrospect, could be viewed as negligent.83 Even though 
an accountant who engages in this kind of conduct presents a substantially 
different situation than that presented by an accountant whose conduct 
poses a continuing and immediate threat to the Commission's processes, 
the standards currently applied by the Commission fail to distinguish these 
two situations. This failure has been among the significant reasons for the 
concerns raised in recent years regarding the imposition of Rule I 02(e) 
sanctions on accountants. 
Reserving Rule I 02(e) sanctions for accountants whom the Commission 
finds to be presently substantially unfit and, therefore, posing a current 
threat of future misconduct harmful to the Commission's processes is es-
pecially appropriate in light of rhe severe impact a Rule 102(e) sanction 
imposes on an accountant. A Rule 102(e) finding that an accountant has 
engaged in "improper professional conduct" can substantially impede the 
efforts of the individual to continue with his or her career (or, for that 
matter, make a fresh start in another field of endeavor). 84 
82. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 763 (Cal. 1992) (en bane); see also John A. 
Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits if Instrumental Tort Riform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 
1962 n.l58 (1988) (stating that "modern audits of complex enterprises require accountants 
to make numerous judgments about the proper characterizations of the data and the relia-
bility of the client's accounting systems"); James F. Strother, The Establishment if Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, 28 V AND. L. REV. 20 I, 20 I 
( 1975) ("The complexity of generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted 
auditing standards is belied, and perhaps obscured, by their familiar acronyms .... "). 
83. See, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F. 3d 452, 4 79 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (''Accounting principles 
must be interpreted. Judgments must be made about specific transactions. '[R]easonable 
preparers of financial statements'-often management-'and auditors can disagree about 
those interpretations and judgments.'") (quoting JERRY D. SULUVAl'\1 ET AL., MONTGOM-
ERY'S AUDITING 19 (10th ed. 1985)) (opinion of Randolph, CJ.). 
84. While the Task Force believes there must be a threshold test for the imposition ofRule 
I 02(e) sanctions, the Task Force suggests that once the criteria for the imposition of a Rule 
I 02(e) sanction are met, the Commission should consider structuring Rule I 02(e) sanctions 
in light of a respondent's particular deficiencies. The Commission currently imposes censures, 
suspensions, or bars designed to address specific circumstances. In addition, the Commission 
might consider the possibility that a respondent who has demonstrated unfitness in a specific 
area could, through education and training, correct his or her unfitness. Thus, if a respondent 
is deemed to be substantially unfit to practice as an accountant because the respondent has 
demonstrated an inadequate understanding of GAAS, then the Commission might consider 
limiting the respondent's practice before the Commission as an independent public account-
ant unless he or she is adequately supervised or until he or she has undertaken training and 
education in the requirements of GAAS. A respondent who understands GAAP but has an 
inadequate appreciation of GAAS, however, should not be precluded from participating in 
the preparation of financial statements as, for example, a member of the finance and accounting 
department of a public company, as opposed to having ultimate responsibility for the appli-
cation if the auditing standards to those financial statements. 
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Moreover, Rule l 02(e)'s continued viability is open to renewed, and 
perhaps fatal, challenge if the Commission determines to rely on isolated 
negligent conduct as a predicate for the initiation of Rule l 02(e) proceed-
ings. Such a course may provide a strong basis for challenging the validity 
of particular sanctions, and the Rule itself, as not "reasonably related" to 
the purposes of the federal securities Jaws. 85 The federal courts have pre-
viously signaled their receptivity to such a challenge to Rule l 02(e). As the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed in Davy: "We do not 
consider whether cases can arise in which the SEC in Rule 2(e) matters 
exceeds its proper jurisdictional boundaries. The precise reach of the SEC 
in these situations has not been defined and we leave that task for a future 
case which implicates that question directly."86 Under these circumstances, 
the Commission's efforts to impose Rule 102(e) sanctions would also be 
frustrated if a higher proportion of Rule 1 02(e) proceedings were litigated 
and appealed, rather than settled. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of policy, the Commission should administer Rule l02(e) in 
light of its remedial purpose and require that Rule l 02(e) sanctions not be 
imposed unless the entire record, including the respondent's overall pro-
fessional qualifications, experience, and conduct, demonstrates that the 
respondent is presently substantially unfit to practice before the Commis-
sion and, therefore, poses a current threat of future misconduct harmful 
to the Commission's processes. Although the consideration of these factors 
in determining whether an accountant engaged in "improper professional 
conduct" may be viewed by some as restricting the Commission's Rule 
l02(e) authority, in fact, the Task Force believes that such a clarification 
of the standard applied by the Commission will confirm and add legiti-
macy to such authority, and is entirely appropriate given the need for at 
least minimal due process when a person's livelihood is at stake. 87 Such a 
85. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
86. Davy v. SEC, 792 F2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986). As previously discussed, Judge 
Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit made a similar observation in 
his opinion in Checkosky: 
If the Commission were to determine that an accountant's negligence is a per seviolation 
of Rule 2(e), it would have to consider not only the administrative burden such a position 
would entail but also whether it would constitute a de facto substantive regulation of the 
profession and thus raise questions as to the legitimacy of Rule 2(e)(l)(ii)-or at least its 
scope. 
Checkosky, 23 F. 3d at 459 (opinion of Silberman, CJ.). 
87 . Although not the subject of this report, we note that the Commission already has 
imposed restrictions on its ability to initiate Rule 102(e) proceedings against lawyers. See 
Disciplinary Proceedings Release, supra note 16 (stating that Rule 102(e) proceedings against 
lawyers are " a vehicle for protecting the Commission against further practice by attorneys 
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direct focus on professional fitness would better serve to protect the in-
vesting public, would better tailor the use of remedial sanctions to circum-
stances of particular professionals, is consistent with the Commission's mis-
sion, and would be far more likely than a "past negligence" standard to 
pass judicial muster. 
who have been the subject of other judicial or administrative proceedings involving securities 
law violations"). The practice of premising Rule I 02(e) proceedings on judicial orders was 
questioned when the U.S. Supreme Court eliminated the viability of the primary means by 
which lawyers had been sanctioned: aiding and abetting a Rule I Ob-5 violation. See Central 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994); 
Simon M. Lorne, Securities and Exchange Commission Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Lawyers After Central Bank, Address to the 27th Annual Securities Regulation Seminar 
(Oct. 3, 1994) ("With the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Central Bank, the Commis-
sion's options in cases involving lawyers may have been narrowed to an extent that raises 
vexing questions.") . This objection was eliminated in 1995 when Congress reinstated the 
Commission's authority to prosecute aiding and abetting violations of the Exchange Act. See 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 756 
( 1995) (codified at I 5 U.S. C. § 78t(Q (Supp. I I 995)); see also SEC Commissioner Norman S. 
Johnson, Remarks before the Committee on Federal Regulation ofSecurities of the American 
Bar Association's Section of Business Law (Nov. 8, I 996) (confirming the continued viability 
of this approach) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law). 
In this regard, however, it should be noted that the Commission has a statutory anchor for 
the regulation of accounting practices which it does not have in connection with the regu-
lation of the practice of law. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994) (stating that the Commission 
has the authority to "de fin [ e] accounting, technical and trade terms used in this title"); id. 
§ 77aa(25), (26) (stating that balance sheets and profit and loss statements filed as part of a 
registration statement shall be "in such detail and such form as the Commission shall pre-
scribe"); id. § 78«b)(l)ffi, (K) (stating that balance sheets and profit and loss statements filed 
as part of an application for registration on a national securities exchange shall be "in such 
detail" as the Commission may require); id. § 78m(b)(l) (stating that the Commission may 
prescribe " methods to be followed" in preparation of accounting reports). In a Commission 
release, the Commission expressly distinguished the authority it exercises under Rule l02(e) 
with regard to accountants from that which it exercises with regard to lawyers: 
The Commission has express statutory authority under the federal securities laws to 
prescribe the requirements for financial statements that have been filed with the Com-
mission. Expertise to determine whether these standards have been properly applied is 
a corollary of that power. 
With respect to attorneys, the Commission generally has not sought to develop or 
apply independent standards of professional conduct .... [I]he Commission, as a mat-
ter of policy, generally refrains from using its administrative forum to conduct de novo 
determinations of the professional obligations of attorneys. 
Disciplinary Proceedings Release, supra note I 6, at 89,244. 
